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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
There must be power in the States and the Nation to re-
mould, through experimentation, our economic practices and
institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.
-Louis D. BRANDEIS.
DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
1950-1960
AUGUSTINE J. BOWE AND JOHN D. CASEY
URING THE DECADE ending in 1960, remedies available to the
Illinois working man for injuries sustained in the course of
employment have been expanded and made more effective.
His remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Work-
men's Occupational Diseases Act have been supplemented by remedies,
formerly denied to him, against negligent parties other than his em-
ployer, and against violators of the Scaffolding Act.
The most noticeable changes in the Workmen's Compensation Act
and Occupational Diseases Act are in the amounts of compensation
payable for injuries and deaths. Under the 1949 acts, the maximum
rate of weekly compensation for disability of a childless employee
was $22.50; under the 1959 acts it is now $45.00.1 Under the 1949
acts the maximum death benefit of a childless widow of an employee
was $6,000.00; under the 1959 acts it is now $12,250.002
REVISION OF THE WORKMEN S COMPENSATION AND
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES ACTS
By 1949 the Workmen's Compensation Act of 19133 had, by the
accretion of biennial amendments, become a complex and nearly in-
I ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, S 138.8(b) (1959); IlM. Laws 1949, at 869.
2 ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 48, S 138.7 (a) (1959); IM. Laws 1949, at 869.
8 11. Laws 1949, at 1811.
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coherent piece of legislation. Hence, in 1951, it was considered ex-
pedient to revise the verbiage of the statute; the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of 19514 was the result, and the 1913 act was repealed.
No important substantial change, other than increases in the amount
of compensation payable, was effected by the 1951 act, the changes
being merely a simplification and rearrangement of the language of
the 1913 act. The Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act of 19361
was similarly repealed, revised, and re-enacted as the Workmen's
Occupational Diseases Act of 1951.6
The provision requiring that a claim for compensation be made
by the employee within six months from the date of his accident or
disablement has, by amendment, been eliminated from both the Com-
pensation and Occupational Diseases Acts. Formerly, in cases where
no compensation was paid, the employee could not recover compen-
sation unless he proved that the employer had notice of accident
within thirty days and notice that the employee was claiming com-
pensation within six months; the latter requirement has been elim-
inated, and it is now sufficient if notice of accident is given in forty-
five days.'
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES ACT MADE MANDATORY IN THE '50'S
The most significant legislative change in the Workmen's Occu-
pational Diseases Act during the decade was an amendment making
it compulsory. As enacted in 1936, it was in two parts: Section 38
provided that an employee contracting an occupational disease in con-
sequence of his employer's negligence could maintain an action at
law for damages against his employer; section 40 and the other sections
of the act (referred to as the compensation provisions of the act)
provided that employers could elect to pay compensation to their
employees for disability resulting from occupational diseases, and
employers so electing were relieved of the liability for damages pro-
vided for in section 3. The compensation provisions of the act pro-
vided in general that an employee disabled by an occupational disease
should receive approximately the same compensation as he would
receive under the Workmen's Compensation Act if he were disabled
by an accidental injury. Experience showed that it was often cheaper
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 (1959). 7 ILm. RV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.6(c) (1959).
rIll. Laws 1949, at 1830. 8 11. Laws 1949, at 1831.
6 IL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, S 172.36 (1959). 9Ibid.
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in the long run for employers to refrain from electing to be bound
by the compensation provisions of the act and to defend damage
claims under section 3. The courts held that an employee claiming
damages under section 3 was obliged to prove that the employer vio-
lated some health or safety rule promulgated by the Industrial Com-
mission,10 and as the Commission promulgated very few rules aimed
at preventing occupational diseases an employee suffering from an
occupational disease had practically no remedy if his employer had
not elected to be bound by the compensation provisions of the act.
In 1957, the act was amended" to provide that the compensation pro-
visions should automatically and without election bind all employers
who are bound automatically by section 3 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act,12 which covers practically all employments in which
there is an occupational disease hazard.
TORT LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES
Industrial accidents frequently occur under circumstances creating
a legal liability for damages on the part of persons other than the em-
ployer of an employee who has been injured in the course of his em-
ployment; for example, when a street laborer is struck by a motor
truck and injured, he has a compensation claim against his employer,
and he may have a damage claim against the operator of the truck
(referred to as the "third party tort-feasor"). In the 1913 Workmen's
Compensation Act, the employee's right to collect damages from a
third party tort-feasor was governed and limited by section 29, which
was incorporated in the 1951 act without substantial change as section
5 (b).3 Under this provision of the law, as construed over thirty-five
years by the courts, an injured employee bound by the act could not
sue a third party tort-feasor who was also bound by the act.14 Thus in
the case of the example of the street laborer mentioned above, the in-
jured man could not sue the truck operator if the operator were also
bound to pay his employees compensation under the act, and the in-
jured employee had to be content with the relatively small benefits
paid by his employer as compensation. However, if the third party
10 Grutzius v. Armour& Co., 312 IM. App. 366,38 N.E.2d 773 (1941).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 5 172.37 (1959).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, S 138.3 (1959).
1111. Laws 1951, at 1067.
14 Petrazelli v. Propper, 409 111.365, 99 N.E.2d 140 (1951).
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was not bound by the act-if, for instance, the truck were operated by
a farmer, or a lawyer, or by an employee operating under the law of
another state, the injured employee could sue and collect damages
from the tort-feasor. 5
In Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co.,'6 determined in March 1952, a
proceeding for common-law damages by an injured employee against
a third party tort-feasor bound by the act, the pertinent portion of
section 29 was held unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the
due process and equal protection of law clauses of the state and fed-
eral constitutions by creating an unreasonable classification between
employees injured by tort-feasors bound by the act and employees
injured by tortfeasors not under the act.
Following the Grasse decision, section 5 (b) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (which corresponded to section 29 of the 1913
act) was amended to conform with that decision. As the law now
stands, an injured employee bound by the act can sue any third party
tort-feasor other than a fellow-employee in the same employment; out
of any recovery made the employer is entitled to be reimbursed for the
loss incurred in paying the employee compensation and providing
medical services, provided the employer has not been guilty of negli-
gence contributing to the employee's injury.
The Grasse case not only had the effect of giving injured employees
remedies against negligent tort-feasors, but it restored to employees in
the building construction and maintenance trades a remedy under the
statute commonly referred to as the Scaffolding Act,17 passed in 1907,
a remedy that had been in abeyance since 1913 because section 29 of
the Compensation Act prevented employees from suing tort-feasors
bound by the act. The Scaffolding Act requires that scaffolds, hoists,
cranes, ladders, and other devices used in the erection or maintenance
of any building or other structure be erected and operated so as to
give adequate protection to persons employed on or about them, and
makes the owner, contractor, or other person having charge of the
construction work responsible for complying with the act and liable to
pay damages to any person injured in consequence of a willful viola-
15 Gones v. Fisher, 286 Ill. 606, 122 N.E. 95 (1919); Huntoon v. Pritchard, 371 Il.
36,20 N.E.2d 53 (1939).
16 412 I11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1959); Ill. Laws 1907, at 312.
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tion. Thus in Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 8 the plaintiff recovered a
judgment against Shell Oil Company, the owner of a large oil process-
ing structure that was being constructed by an independent contractor
who employed the plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a
scaffold which was erected by the contractor and which was not con-
structed as required by the Scaffolding Act.
PROHIBITION OF TORT ACTIONS AGAINST FELLOW SERVANT
A long line of cases on the subject of an employee's right to sue a
person in the same employment for tortious conduct was brought to an
end by O'Brien v. Rautenbusb.1 Involved here was the construction of
section 5 of the 1951 Act, and the court concluded that such actions
were prohibited. In 1959, section 5 (a) 20 was amended to conform with
that decision, and more recently the court held that many of the reasons
given for its decision in the O'Brien case were dicta.21 While a major-
ity of persons covered by the act will be unaffected by this change, it
does affect office and sales personnel who travel with one another. The
flamboyant sales manager who outfits himself with a private airplane
and orders his men to fly with him to a convention is given question-
able immunity from civil liability. In travel situations there is usually
insurance available to cover the liability for tortious conduct. The
effect of the amendment is to make liability insurance unavailable to
persons in the same employment.
It has been estimated that the additional remedies now available to
injured employees account for recoveries upwards of $5,000,000 per
annum in Illinois. This benefits employers as well as employees, since
non-negligent employers share in the recoveries, and the burden of
paying for the consequences of tortious conduct is properly put upon
the guilty parties.
18 13 Ill.2d 431,150 N.E.2d 134 (1958).
19 10 I1l.2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1956).
2 0 hW.. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (a) (1959).
"I Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry., 17 111.2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959).
